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Abstract. This paper describes how location-aware Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) can be implemented on top of the Geographically eX-
tensible Access Control Markup Language (GeoXACML). It furthermore
sketches how spatial separation of duty constraints (both static and dy-
namic) can be implemented using GeoXACML on top of the XACML
RBAC profile. The solution uses physical addressing of geographical lo-
cations which facilitates easy deployment of authorisation profiles to the
mobile device. Location-aware RBAC can be used to implement location
dependent access control and also other security enhancing solutions on
mobile devices, like location dependent device locking, firewall, intrusion
prevention or payment anti-fraud systems.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate how location-aware RBAC poli-
cies can be implemented in the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML), which is an authorisation policy language [15]. The solution is based
on existing proﬁles for RBAC [3], and the Geospatial eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (GeoXACML) for location based access control [2].
There are numerous application possibilities for location-aware RBAC. It can
be useful for automatic locking/unlocking of the phone based on location. The
phone can for example be automatically unlocked in the work premises and
at home, but not anywhere else. Another possibility is to use location-aware
RBAC for mobile payment applications, to handle location-dependent threats
for a mobile payment service. Payment may for example not be recommended or
permitted in certain areas. This can either be due to threats against the mobile
terminal, like the threat of physical theft or the risk of a localised cyber attack
against the mobile terminal in a given location, for example at a rogue access
point or bluetooth attacks. It can also be because the risk of fraud is considered
large in the given location, based on past known incidents. Another strategy is
to explicitly allow mobile payments by letting the user authorise a new location
by providing his credentials. This can be used to reduce the risk of fraud, since
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mobile payments then only would work in locations and with vendors that were
explicitly authorised by the owner.
We assume that the exchange of information related to XACML policy ad-
ministration can be performed securely, for example over an encrypted link with
signed messages, to ensure the conﬁdentiality and integrity of the XACML policy
management. It is furthermore assumed that the storage and execution environ-
ment can be secured using trusted computing or similar techniques. The paper
does not go into details on the authentication process, which can be covered us-
ing existing methods and protocols, for example based on the Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML).
This paper is organised as follows: The next section describes how the RBAC
proﬁle of XACML implements role-based access control. Section 3 introduces
GeoXACML, which is an extension of XACML that provides support for ﬁne-
grained authorisation based on geographical data types and functions. This sec-
tion furthermore elaborates on how location-aware RBAC can be implemented
using GeoXACML. Section 4 gives an example of a role-based authorisation pol-
icy for intrusion prevention systems based on GeoXACML. Section 5 discusses
advantages and disadvantages with the proposed solution, Section 6 goes through
related work and Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses future work.
2 RBAC in XACML
Subsequent sections assume that the reader has a basic understanding of XACML.
In the following, the XACML 3.0 namespace is denoted as &xacml ;, the XML
Schema namespace is denoted as &xs; and our own extensions are deﬁned in
the namespace http://www.prile.org:, denoted by &prile; and roles, deﬁned as
&xacml;:subject:role:, are in short denoted as &role;. The GeoXACML names-
pace urn:ogc:def:dataType:geoxacml:1.0: is in short denoted &geox;.
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS) has deﬁned core and hierarchical RBAC proﬁles of XACML 2.0 [3].
Figure 1 illustrates how the XACML RBAC proﬁle can be implemented in a
Service Oriented Architecture. The most noticeable diﬀerence, compared to the
standard RBAC model, is that the authorisation model is subdivided into three
main functions:
– a Role Enabling Authority (REA) that is responsible for managing the User
Assignment (UA) mapping (users to roles) in the standard RBAC model;
– an Identity Manager that both authenticates the users towards diﬀerent
roles, manages user sessions and can send authorisation requests to access
given objects or resources towards the XACML Policy Decision Point (PDP);
– the XACML RBAC profile that gives authenticated sessions, with a set of
enabled roles, access to given objects/resources based on the permissions
these roles have in the XACML PDP.
The REA can be combined with the Identity Manager into an Identity Provider
or Single Sign-On (SSO) service that provides authentication and authorisation
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Fig. 1. Implementation of the RBAC model in a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA),
based on the RBAC profile of XACML
of users. Examples of such services can be LDAP directory services or feder-
ated services like Shibboleth1 that can use SAML in web services to perform
authorisation requests towards the PDP running the XACML RBAC proﬁle.
SAML assertions can then be veriﬁed by the PEP, presuming that the PEP is
trusted. This paper does however not go into the details of the SAML-XACML
interaction for space reasons.
The XACML RBAC proﬁle [3] deﬁnes how XACML policies can be used to
implement the core and hierarchical parts of the NIST RBAC model [9]. This
proﬁle expresses:
– RBAC user_sessions that are implemented as XACML <Attributes> rep-
resenting authorised users and currently enabled roles for each user in the
XACML <Subject> elements;
– RBAC Roles are expressed as Role <PolicySet> elements;
– RBAC Objects (OBS) are expressed using XACML <Resource> elements;
– RBAC Operations (OPS) are expressed using XACML <Action> elements;
– RBAC Permissions (PRMS) are expressed using XACML Permission <Pol-
icySet> elements;
– RBAC Permissions Assignment (PA) and Hierarchical RBAC are imple-
mented using the <PolicySetIdReference> element which refers to other
Permission <PolicySet> elements.
The XACML Role and Permission policy sets make it easy to extend the permis-
sion assignments, to handle location dependent roles or permissions, by adding
additional constraints on the respective policy sets. Permissions from diﬀerent
Permission policy sets can be aggregated by including a <PolicySetIdReference>
1 Shibboleth can be found at http://shibboleth.internet2.edu
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element to each set of permissions that should be included into the policy set
of a given role. The role hierarchy is therefore implicitly deﬁned in the XACML
RBAC proﬁle by adding <PolicySetIdReference> pointers to inherited permis-
sions from other roles, as shown in Fig. 2.
A diﬀerence between the XACML RBAC proﬁle and the standard NIST
RBAC model, is that the deﬁnition of RBAC Users and Sessions normally are
external to the XACML RBAC proﬁle. The RBAC XACML proﬁle presumes
that the role(s) and session speciﬁed in the XACML request are valid for the
given user. Handling of which roles a given user is allowed to enable must instead
be done in the REA and sessions are authenticated by the Identity Manager.
An additional restriction in the XACML RBAC proﬁle, is that an RBAC
compliant XACML PDP must ensure that Permission <PolicySet> instances
can never be used as the initial policy of an XACML PDP [3]. This can for
example be ensured by keeping Role and Permission policy sets in separate
PDP’s or by adding a semantic restriction that only Role policy sets can be
accessed directly in requests towards the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
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<Request>
  <Subject>
    <Attribute AttributeId=”&role;”
     DataType=”&xml;anyURI”>
      <AttributeValue>
       &roles;employee
      </AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Subject>
  <Resource>
    <Attribute 
     AttributeId=”resource-id”
     DataType=”&xml;string”>
      <AttributeValue>
       ids
      </AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Resource>
  <Action>
    <Attribute 
     AttributeId=”action-id”
     DataType=”&xml;anyURI”>
      &actions;read
    </attribute>
  </Action>
</Request>
<PolicySet 
 PolicySetId=”PPS:employee:role”
 … CombiningAlgId=”permit-overrides”>
  <Policy PolicyId=”employee:role”>
    <Rule RuleId=”ids:access”
     Effect=”Permit”>
      <Target>
        <Resources><Resource>
                  
        </Resource></Resources>
        <Actions><Action>
        </Action></Actions>
      </Target>
    </Rule>
  </Policy>
  <PolicySetIdReference>
    PPS:person:role
  </PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>
resource-id ==ids
<ResourceMatch ...>
action-id ==read
<ActionMatch ...>
<PolicySet 
 PolicySetId=”RPS:employee:role”
 … Comb.AlgId=”permit-overrides”>
  <Target>
    <Subjects><Subject>
      <SubjectMatch 
       MatchId=”...:anyURI-equal”>
        <AttributeValue
         DataType=”&xml;anyURI”>
          &roles;Employee
        </AttributeValue>
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator
         AttributeId=”&role;”
         DataType=”&sml:anyURI”/>
      </SubjectMatch>
     </Subject></Subjects>
  </Target>
  <PolicySetIdReference>
    PPS:employee:role
  </PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>
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</ResourceMatch>
</ActionMatch>
Fig. 2. Inter-dependencies between the XACML Request, the Role policy set and the
Permissions (Prms) policy set both for core and hierarchical RBAC
The set of <Subject> attributes in the XACML request furthermore contains
the role or a set of roles being enabled by this session. The <Resource> attribute
of the request refers to the object(s) (OBS) being authorised, and the <Action>
attribute of the request describes the operation(s) (OPS) that will be performed
on the object(s). Fig. 2 shows that the permission assignments (PA) is done by
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adding a <PolicySetIdReference> pointer to the Permissions <PolicySet> that
contains the permissions for the given role.
The approach chosen for the XACML RBAC proﬁle will in general provide
a lower granularity for PA than the traditional RBAC model, since it refers
to a <PolicySet> for a given role, instead of providing a true many to many
relationship between permissions and roles. The XACML RBAC proﬁle does
in other words implement roles, but not strictly according to the NIST RBAC
standard. It is perhaps neither viable nor desirable to implement the RBAC
standard with ﬁner PA granularity, since the current design allows for some
ﬂexibility in the permission handling that does not exist in standard RBAC. It
is for example easy to add support for location handling or other constraints
on permission level. It may on the other hand not be viable to implement very
ﬁne-grained permission handling due to the XML parsing overhead in XACML.
This means that the XACML RBAC model is a hybrid between XACML and
RBAC.
3 GeoXACML
GeoXACML deﬁnes an extension of XACML for spatial data types and spatial
authorisation functions. The spatial data types are based on the Geographical
Markup Language version 3 (GML3) [14]. These data types and functions can
be used to deﬁne spatial constraints for XACML based policies [2], which means
that it is possible to support declaration and enforcement of access restrictions
on geographic information. GeoXACML deﬁnes mainly the geometry model for
geometric data types in access rules and geometric functions that can operate
on these geometric data types.
<Condition FunctionId="&geox;geometry -intersects">
<Apply FunctionId="&geox;geometry -one -and -only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="my-position "
DataType ="&geox;geometry "/>
</Apply >
<AttributeValue DataType ="&geox;geometry ">
<gml:Polygon id="Grimstad " srsName ="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG :6.6:4326"
xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis .net/gml">
<gml:exterior >
<gml:LinearRing >
<gml:posList dimension="2">
58.34 8.59 58.5 8.60 ...
</gml:posList >
</gml:LinearRing >
</gml:exterior >
</gml:Polygon >
</AttributeValue >
</Condition >
Fig. 3. GeoXACML geographical Condition example
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3.1 Implementing Location-Aware RBAC Based on GeoXACML
Location-aware RBAC can be implemented by adding constraints in the form
of Conditions on the role and permission policy sets that evaluate a logical
expression based on GeoXACML geographical functions. Fig. 3 shows an exam-
ple XACML condition that checks whether the device position reported by the
<Subject> attribute my-position intersects with or is contained in the polygon
deﬁning the town Grimstad. This subject attribute contains the current GPS po-
sition of the device, for example represented as a GeoXACML circular polygon
with radius equal to the measurement uncertainty. This subject attribute can
either be provided by the XACML Policy Information Point (PIP) or it can be
passed in as part of the XACML request. The function geometry-one-and-only
is needed because the <SubjectAttributeDesignator> element returns a bag of
potentially zero or more elements. This function returns the ﬁrst element of type
geometry, and if there are no such elements or more than one element, then the
function returns INDETERMINATE.
Adding location dependent constraints on the Permissions <PolicySet> gives
the possibility to place additional geographical restrictions on inherited permis-
sions. This eﬀectively means that it is possible to add geographical restrictions
on any level desired, from a course-grained role level and to a ﬁne grained per-
missions level. XACML Constraints also make it easy to add permissions that
apply everywhere but a given set of locations. For example a ﬁrewall rule that
is applicable for any position p except an area A can be expressed by inverting
the result of the geometrical inclusion test, i.e. p /∈ A.
It should also be noted that the proposed model also supports temporally
aware RBAC policies based on XACML. This can be implemented by adding
XACML <Condition> constraints based on standard XACML functions for time
handling in the Role or Permission policysets.
3.2 Spatial Separation of Duties Constraints in GeoXACML
This section sketches how spatial separation of duties constraints can be imple-
mented in GeoXACML. A deﬁciency with the OASIS XACML RBAC proﬁle is
that it does not support static or dynamic separation of duties (SSD/DSD), as
speciﬁed in the RBAC standard [3]. The reason for this, is that the REA and
Identity Management functions are deﬁned outside the XACML RBAC proﬁle,
which means that the assignment of users to roles and management of active
sessions are not deﬁned as part of the XACML RBAC proﬁle. This also means
that a basic assumption is that the XACML authorisation function must trust
the REA in order to implement separation of duties constraints.
SSD constraints mean that a user must not be authorised with conﬂicting
roles [9]. These constraints can be implemented in XACML if the REA exposes
the mapping of currently authorised users to roles as XACML attributes via the
PIP. This can for example be implemented using a SAML AttributeQuery for a
given user, which implies that the user name must be passed in as part of the
XACML request in order to enforce SSD. XACML <Condition> constraints on
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the user-role mapping can then be used in the Role <PolicySet> to verify static
separation of duty constraints by counting the number of enabled roles that are
in the set of conﬂicting roles in the REA for a given user.
DSD puts restrictions on which roles that can be enabled at the same time in
the same user session or across diﬀerent user sessions [9]. DSD can in a similar
way be implemented in XACML if the REA exposes the mapping of active user
sessions to roles as XACML attributes via the PIP. This means that XACML
<Condition> constraints on the user session resources from the Identity Manager
can be used in the Role <PolicySet> to check for conﬂicting roles within or across
user sessions. This will require that a unique session identiﬁer, for example the
SAML session ID, is sent as an attribute of the XACML request.
A central lock manager, for example as suggested in [7], will then be required
to ensure safe policy checks for concurrent authorisation requests, so that the
SSD/DSD constraints ensure that less than a given number of sessions for a
given role are active at the same time. This central lock manager needs to be
extended to block updates of sessions and their roles by the REA and the Identity
Manager during checking of SSD/DSD constraints to avoid race conditions that
could violate the constraints.
Spatial SSD constraints (SSSD) furthermore imply that if a user is assigned
to a role in one location, the user cannot be assigned to another role in this
location if these two roles are conﬂicting [10]. In a similar way, Spatial DSD
constraints (SDSD) ensure that constraints on which roles that can be enabled
in the same user session or across user sessions can be enforced for a given
location. The above mentioned scheme can easily be extended to support SSSD
or SDSD by adding GeoXACML geographical restrictions to the respective SSD
or DSD XACML <Condition> constraints on the Role <PolicySet>.
Implementing dynamic separation of duties constraints for the XACML RBAC
proﬁle is not trivial, since it will require both a central lock manager and an ex-
tension of the REA in order to expose the mapping of active user sessions to
roles. It is also problematic from both security and privacy perspectives that
XACML has access to all active sessions for all users, especially if this occurs in
a federated environment where the authenticated sessions may belong to other
authorisation functions.
4 IPS Policy Example
This section discusses location based permissions for controlling Intrusion Pre-
vention System (IPS) or ﬁrewall rules which can be used to provide more ﬂexible
protection of mobile terminals. This can be implemented by adding a separate
XACML Action, for example configure-ids or configure-firewall, that the IPS or
ﬁrewall can use to authorise and update their rule sets for a given set of user
roles. Some IPS or ﬁrewall rules will then be enabled at any position. Other rules
may be enabled or disabled in certain locations or for certain roles or combina-
tion of roles. This can be done by having a separate threat manager service that
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<PolicySet PolicySetId="PPS:payment:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&xacml;policy-combining -algorithm:permit -overrides">
<Policy PolicyId ="IPS:bluetooth:permissions"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&xacml;rule -combining -algorithm:permit - overrides">
<Rule RuleId="IPS:payment:permissions:in:Grimstad"
Effect="Permit">
<Target >
<Resources><Resource ><AnyResource/></Resource ></Resources>
<Actions ><Action >
<ActionMatch MatchId ="&xacml;function:string -equal">
<AttributeValue DataType ="&xs;string">
configure -ips
</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&xacml;action"
DataType ="&xs;string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action ></Actions >
</Target >
<Condition FunctionId="&geox;geometry -intersects">
<Apply FunctionId="&geox;geometry -one -and -only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="my-position "
DataType ="&geox;geometry "/>
</Apply >
<AttributeValue DataType ="&geox;geometry ">
<gml:Polygon id="Grimstad " srsName ="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG:6.6:4326"
xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis .net/gml">
<gml:exterior><gml:LinearRing>
<gml:posList dimension="2">
58.34 8.59 58.5 8.60 ...
</gml:posList>
</gml:LinearRing></gml:exterior>
</gml:Polygon>
</AttributeValue>
</Condition>
</Rule>
<Obligations>
<Obligation ObligationId="&prile;ips -rule:apply"
FulfillOn="Permit">
<AttributeAssignment AttributeId="&prile;enable:snort:rule:1"
DataType ="&prile;snortrule">
reject tcp $HOME_NET any -&gt; $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (\
msg:"Mobile␣payment ␣attack␣rejected ␣(fraud␣risk)";
flow:to_server ,established; uricontent:"http://www.mybank.com";
nocase; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:10000001; rev:1 ;)
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
</Obligations>
</Policy >
</PolicySet>
Fig. 4. Example Permissions <PolicySet> for location-aware IDS policy
enables or disables the rules based on location dependent threats. Such a service
checks the threat policies and updates IDS and ﬁrewall rules continually based
on parameters such as time, device speed and threat proﬁle updates.
Fig. 4 shows an example Permissions <PolicySet> that is used to conﬁgure
security requirements for the payment role of a mobile device. The <PolicySet>
requires that the IPS should be installed with a rule that rejects connections
to http://www.mybank.com if the user is within the Grimstad area, for example
to reduce the risk of fraud. This rule will be installed the next time the threat
management PEP performs an XACML request on the current user session. If
the user session has the payment role enabled and the PEP issues a configure-ips
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action, then the PDP will reply with a Permit decision with an Obligation to
apply the given IPS rule.
If the user later moves outside of the Grimstad area, then this restriction will
be removed the next time the threat management PEP is scheduled.
5 Discussion
A challenge with the proposed approach, is that the policy management in the
PAP is quite complex. The role hierarchy is for example implicitly deﬁned via
links between permissions policy sets in the XACML RBAC proﬁle, something
that is not very intuitive. Routine policy generation tasks can however be auto-
mated, and the resulting API can be made similar to the functional speciﬁca-
tion in traditional RBAC [9], however with the necessary adaptations to handle
geographical constraints for roles and permissions and also for managing the
permissions policyset. The details of the modiﬁed API is however beyond the
scope of this paper.
A disadvantage with location dependent ﬁrewall rules, is that it may not
be very user friendly or intuitive. The ﬁnal user may for example be puzzled if
location based policies prohibit access, since it is not clear to the user why access
is prohibited. This can however be handled by adding an additional XACML
<Obligation> to the policy that will specify a reason for why access is prohibited,
for example to give a notice that “Access is prohibited in this location to service
XXX due to risk of fraud”.
It is also possible to use other means than ﬁrewall or IPS rules to restrict
access. It would probably be more useful for a mobile payment application if a
successful authorisation returns an obligation containing part of a cryptographic
key needed to gain access to the service, rather than managing ﬁrewall or IPS
rules. In particular on phones where the ﬁrewall or IPS run as untrusted appli-
cations, since these then easily can be disabled by a determined adversary that
has stolen or hacked into and compromised the phone.
An issue that needs to be considered is the reliability of the positioning system,
and whether positions easily can be forged2 in order to avoid location depen-
dent access restrictions. GPS is for instance relatively accurate in an outdoor
environment, but it quickly loses connection indoors.
Another problem is that GPS data coming from the device itself is not guar-
anteed to be correct if the operating system is compromised. For example if a
rootkit or rogue GPS device driver intercepts and changes the GPS signals on
the ﬂy, in order to inﬂuence the authorisation process.
This risk can be reduced to some extent using traditional mitigations like
AntiVirus and good patching and update procedures. It is however more eﬃcient
to use techniques like cryptographically signed drivers and secure booting of
the phone operating system where a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in future
mobile phones ensures that unauthorised modiﬁcations, for example by a rootkit,
2 GPS Spoofing Countermeasures http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/
Dual%20Benefit/warner_gps_spoofing.html
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causes the TPM to refuse booting the phone [8]. The risk of being infected by a
rootkit can probably not be eliminated completely, since there always will be a
risk of stack or buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities or other ﬂaws also in trusted and
signed applications.
This means that using a positioning technique like GPS has its deﬁciencies
when used for access control purposes. These deﬁciencies will also apply if the
access control is used to manage location dependent threats. It is in some cases
hard to put a clear distinction between areas that are safe and areas that are
unsafe and if a safety margin is added to location threats, then this may harm
legal businesses which clearly is undesirable. Using near-ﬁeld communications
(e.g. RFID) together with a proof-of-location protocol is a promising technology
that can be used as an additions means to verify known locations [12]. This
can improve the precision of location-aware RBAC and also reduce the risk of
harming legal businesses.
6 Related Work
This paper describes how location-aware role based access control can be im-
plemented by combining GeoXACML and the RBAC proﬁle of XACML. Such
a GeoXACML-based RBAC solution has to the best of our knowledge not been
published before.
There are numerous previous works on location-based or spatial RBAC mod-
els. This discussion does not cover all RBAC models, but compares our solution
to some of the well known traditional location based RBAC solutions. SRBAC
is one of the earlier models of a spatial RBAC system [10, 11], and it has been
suggested to deﬁne an XACML-based location aware RBAC model based on
SRBAC [1]. Our model has moved the location constraints into the Role and
Permissions (PRMS) deﬁnitions instead of expressing location references as an
explicit relationship between Roles-Locations and Locations-Operations as SR-
BAC does.
GEO-RBAC extends the traditional RBAC model with spatial entities that
are used to model objects, user positions and geographically bounded roles [4, 6].
A model for enforcing spatial constraints for mobile RBAC systems based on
GEO-RBAC is described in [12]. Roles in GEO-RBAC are enabled based on the
position of the user. GEO-RBAC does however not support deﬁning location on
object permissions. LRBAC and LoT-RBAC solve this deﬁciency [13, 5].
The nice feature with all native RBAC models, is that they are fast, eﬃcient
and have well deﬁned formal deﬁnitions founded in set theory. Extensibility for
these models has however evolved over time, and is not yet standardised for
location or time based RBAC models. XACML is on the other hand designed
from the start to be extensible, with rich semantics for deﬁning constraints.
The RBAC proﬁle of XACML implements role based access control, however
not with the same level of granularity as native RBAC solutions and also with
deﬁciencies when it comes to enforcing separation of duties constraints. The
extensibility of XACML makes it easy to embed and combine other XML-based
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standards, like in this case the RBAC proﬁle of XACML and GeoXACML, and it
also makes it trivial to add arbitrary constraints both on roles and permissions.
An advantage with our model is that the physical location deﬁnition is embedded
in the XACML policies, which simpliﬁes deployment of location-based policies.
This is useful for outsourced managed security services, where updated threat
proﬁles then can be generated and deployed according to the needs of the mobile
terminal.
7 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates how location-aware RBAC can be implemented in
GeoXACML, based on the XACML RBAC proﬁle. It furthermore shows how
static and dynamic separation of duties constraints can be implemented for this
solution. An advantage is that it allows for embedding geographical informa-
tion directly into the authorisation policies, instead of using logical addressing
of locations.
A potential disadvantage with an XACML based RBAC solution, is that it
may scale more poorly than a traditional RBAC solution, especially if a large
number of roles and permissions are involved. The main problem in XACML
will then be the parsing overhead of XML documents. This can to some extent
be mitigated using a decision cache under the presumption that location threats
do not change too rapidly.
The general discussion also shows that it can be diﬃcult to put a clear distinc-
tion between areas that are safe and areas that are unsafe due to the inherent
unreliability of positioning systems and also unreliability in the deﬁnition of
what areas are considered unsafe. This may harm legal businesses which clearly
is undesirable. There are in other words several concerns with location-based
threat management and location-based authorisation.
Future work includes implementing and testing the location-aware RBAC
solution, including to elaborate and demonstrate how well the proposed solution
works for static/dynamic spatial separation of duties. There is also more work
required on how to reliably identify locations and properly secure the overall
solution.
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